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IN THE SUPRE.ME C.QURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
TOOELE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
8395

SETTLEl\IENT CANYON IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment,
in "\vhich it was alleged that it was the successor in interest to two contracts entered into by defendant as
First Party and Thomas L. and Annie L. DeLaMare as
Second Parties, dated, respectively, April 8, 1910 and
October 4, 1910. Copies of these contracts were attached
to the petition as Exhibits A and B and are nearly identical in language, the first covering 100 gallons of water
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per minute and the second covering 160 gallons of water
per minute. The execution of these contracts, and that
the plaintiff is the successor in interest of the DeLaMares thereunder, is admitted by defendant in its answer.
For the convenience of the court we here set forth
haec verba the first contract and those parts of the second contract which differ from the first.
"THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this
8th day of April A.D., 1910, by and between SETTLEMENT CANYON IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation organized and exisiting under the laws of the
State of Utah, with its principal place of business at
Tooele City, Utah, the party of the first part, and
THO~!fAS DE LA l\!ARE and ANNIE L. DE LA MARE,
his wife, of Tooele City, Tooele County, State of Utah,
the parties of the second part, WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties of the second part have
developed, by means of a tunnel and other work in Settlement Canyon, near Tooele City, Utah, a flow of water,
and have turned the water, so developed, into Settlement
Canyon Creek and thereby increased the volume of
water naturally flowing in said Creek; and
WHEREAS, the first party is the owner of the
right to use the larger part of said Settlement Canyon
Creek 'vater; and
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WHEREAS, the following resolution was adopted
and passed by unanimous vote of the Board of Directors
of said Settlement Canyon Irrigation Company on the
12th day of November 1909, the owners of two thirds of
all the capital stock in said corporation having consented
to and authorized the same, to-wit:
BE IT RESOL\TED by the Board of Directors of
the Settlement. Canyon Irrigation Company that said
Company hereby recognizes and declares the right of
said Thomas De La Mare and Annie L. De La Mare to
recover from said Creek a continuous and perpetual flow
of one hundred gallons of water per minute, in lieu of
the water developed and added to the natural flow of
said creek by them, and that the said flow of one hundred
gallons of water per minute, which the said Thomas De
La Mare and Annie L. De La Mare are entitled to recover,
as aforesaid, may be taken and diverted by them, their
heirs and assigns from the water flowing out of that certain tunnel, situated in the Southwest Y-1 of the Southwest 14 of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 West,
of the Salt Lake l\1eridian, and from which the Tooele
City Water Company now takes its water for supplying
the inhabitants of Tooele City;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the President
and Secretary of this corporation be, and they are hereby
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authorized to execute and deliver In the name of the
Company, attested by its corporate seal a proper agreement between the said Company and said Thomas De
La 1\Iare and Annie L. De La Mare to carry this resolution into effect.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the sum of one dollar by each of the parties
to the other paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said party of the first part agrees to and
does hereby recognize and declare the right of the parties
of the second part to recover from said Creek a continuous and perpetual flow of one hundred gallons per minute, of the water belonging to the party of the first part,
in lieu of the water so developed and added to the natural
flow of said Creek by the parties of the second part ;
and the first party further agrees that the said continuous and perpetual flow of one hundred gallons per minute of the water belonging to the party of the first part,
to which the parties of the second part are entitled as
aforesaid, may al\vays be taken and diverted by them,
their heirs or assigns, from the water flowing out of the
certain tunnel, situated in the Southwest 1,4 of the Southwest 14 of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 West
of the Salt Lake Meridian, and from which the Tooele
City Water Company now takes water for supplying the
inhabitants of Tooele City.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
caused these presents to be duly executed the day and
year first above written.
SETTLEMENT CANYON
IRRIGATION COJ\IPANY

(Seal)

/s/ Frank W. Frailey By /s/ John ~f. McKellar
President
Secretary
/s/ Thomas DeLa Mare
/s/ Annie L. DeLa Mare

/s/ Wm. Marks
Witness
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF TOOELE

On this 8th day of April, A.D. 1910, personally
appeared before me John M. McKellar and Frank W.
Frailey who being by me severally duly sworn for himself, did say that the said John M. McKellar is President
of the SETTLEMENT CANYON IRRIGATION COMpANY, the corporation whose name is subscribed to the
foregoing instrument, and the said Frank W. Frailey is
Secretary of said corporation; that such instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a
resolution of its board of directors, and the said John
1L McKeller and Frank W. Frailey duly acknowledged
to me that said corporation executed the same.
(Seal)
1fy Cominission expires
/s/ Wm. S. Marks
Notary Public
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF TOOELE

} ss.

On this 8th day of April, A.D., 1910, personally
appeared before n1e Thomas De La Mare and Annie L.
De La Mare, his wife, signers of the foregoing instrument, who severally duly acknowledged to me that they,
and eaeh of them, executed the same.
(Seal)
My Commission expires June 19, 1912
/s/ Wm. Marks
Notary Public
Recorded at the request of Henry Doremus, April
18th, 1910, at 30 minutes past 10 o'clock A.M. in book D
of Bonds and Agreements page 438.

/s/ Fred Bryan
Recorder Tooele County, Ut.
Fees $2.50
The resolution quoted in the third Whereas clause
of the Second contract recites that the defendant "recognizes and declares the right of Thomas De La Mare
and Annie L. De La Mare to recover from said Creek
a continuous and perpetual flow of Four Hundred Fifty
450 gallons of water per minute in lieu of the water
developed and to be developed and added to the natural
flow of said Creek by them, and that the said flow of
450 gallons of water per minute which the said Thon1as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
De La 1\Iare and Annie L. De La Mare are entitled to
recover, as aforesaid, n1ay be taken and diverted by
them, their heirs and assigns from the water flowing
out of that certain tunnel," describing the same tunnel.
The Second contract adds a ne'v Whereas clause as
follows:
"AND WHERAS, since the passage of said resolution, said Thomas De La Mare has developed water so
that he now has two hundred sixty gallons of water per
minute in said tunnel, and that One Hundred gallons of
said amount has already been transferred and set over
to him, leaving one hundred sixty gallons per minute yet
to be transferred, (only two hundred sixty of said four
hundred fifty gallons having been developed) and the
parties hereto mutually agreeing to annual said resolution as to the one hundred ninety gallons per minute not
developed."
The "NOW, THEREFORE," part of the Second
contract is identical with the same part of the first contract, except it specifies 160 gallons of water per minute
and adds that that quantity is "in addition to the 100
gallons per minute heretofore transferred."
In addition to the foregoing, the following matters,
alleged in the petition, are admitted by defendant's answer:
The DeLaMares, by n1eans of tunneling and other
\vorks in Settlement Canyon developed and brought
water into and commingled the same with the flow of
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Settlement Canyon Creek thereby increasing the flow
of said creek. After· developing said water, the DeLa~Iares entered into the said contracts with defendant,
and into contracts with other parties also entitled to use
-vvater from said creek, to define and compose the rights
of the DeLal\fares to the water so developed by them
and to provide a point in the Canyon at which they should
be entitled to divert and take the water developed by
them. At all times since the execution of said contracts
260 gallons of water per minute have been taken by plaintiff's predecessors in interest, and by plaintiff, from the
point of diversion fixed in the contracts (commonly
known as Rench tunnel) until1954, when a dispute arose
as to the right of plaintiff to take 260 gallons per minute.
Defendant contended that under the contra~ts plaintiff
could take that quantity only if that quantity was flowing from the DeLaMares tunnel. It is the contention of
the plaintiff that under the terms of the contracts it was
entitled to a perpetual and unconditional flow of 260
gallons of water per minute from the diversion point
fixed by the contracts regardless of the quantity flowing
from the DeLaMares tunneling and workings, whether
greater or less than 260 gallons per minute.
The foregoing matters being admitted, the sole issue
involved in the action was a proper construction of the
contracts; that is, whether the language of the contracts
supports the plaintiff's or the defendant's contention.
Accordingly, to have this issue determined, the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. This
motion was argued to and granted by the Lower Court.
A judgment for plaintiff in harmony vvith plaintiff's contention was duly entered.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
WHERE A CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS ITS MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED SOLELY FROM I'TS CONTENT'S.
POINT II
BY THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE CON'TRACTS
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DELAMARES WERE, AND
PLAINTIFF AS THEIR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST IS, ENTITLED UNCONDITIONALLY TO A PERPETUAL AND CONTINUOUS FLOW OF 260 GALLON'S OF WATER PER MINUTE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE A CONTRACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS ITS MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED SOLELY FROM I'TS CONTENTS.

The case of City of Des Moines v. City of West Des
Moines 56 N.W. 2d 904, was an action for a declaratory
judgment to construe a contract between the parties and
was disposed of on a motion for judgment on the pleadIngs.
In 1925 the plaintiff City of Des Moines and the defendant City of West Des Monies entered into a contract
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by which plaintiff "does hereby grant" to the defendant
"the continuing right to connect the sanitary sewer system of said (defendant) to the sanitary system of the
Southwest sewer as an outlet for the sanitary sewer
system of" (defendant), the connection to be made at a
described point. Defendant "may also connect its sanitary
sewer system with said Southwest sewer system at any
point where it is practicable and feasible so to do as an
outlet." Defendant is to pay $40,000 on November 1, 1925,
and $2000 annually for 10 years, $2500 annually thereafter for 10 years on giving notice, and "thereafter there
shall be due and payable, by (defendant) to (plaintiff)
an annual sum equal to 50c per capita of population of
defendant at time of giving said notice." Further extensions of 10 year periods could be made by giving like
notice and paying like amount per capita annually thereafter. "It is agreed that the amounts stipulated in this
contract shall constitute compensation in full for the perpetual use of said Southwest sewer system for emptying
into said sewer system all sewage and liquids accumulating in the sanitary system of (defendant) for the treatment and disposal of the same.'"
. Alleging that the rights of defendant city to use the
sewer outlet under this contract were limited to defendant's 1925 boundaries, plaintiff brought suit for a declaratory judgment to adjudicate the rights of the parties
under the contract, defendant's boundaries having been
enlarged by annexations in 1940, 1948 and 1950. Plaintiff prayed that defendant's rights be limited to sewage
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originating within its 1925 boundaries and that new contracts be required or plaintiff pay a reasonable sum for
use of plaintiff's facilities by said portion of defendant
city as became a part thereof subsequent to the 1925 contract, or that use be enjoined.
When the case was at issue defendant moved for
judgment on the pleadings, which was sustained. The
court says:
"No language in the contract specifically
limits the rights of defendant city to its 1925 geographical boundaries. Nor may such inference
properly be drawn from any of its provisions.
The provisions fixing the compensation for use
of the outlet indicate the parties expected defendant city would grow.
"The language of the contract is plain and
unambiguous. It clearly includes all sewage accumulating in the sanitary sewer system of defendant and does not exclude defendant's sewers
within the boundaries of defendant city as thereafter extended. We hold plaintiff was not entitled to relief predicated on the terms of the
written contract."

Duhame v. United States, 119 Fed. Supp. 192. The
question in this case was the construction of the following
contract provision :
''If in the case of an increase of any existing
tax or imposition of a new tax the contractor has
paid such tax or charge to the Federal government, or any person, then the prices herein will
be increased accordingly and will be charged to the
government."
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Plaintiff contends the word "or any person," created
an ambiguity "\\7hich 'Jlould permit proof that the parties
intended to include state taxes. The court says:
"All material facts needed for a decision on
the issue presented are undisputed, and since the
sole issue is one of law that is, interpretation of a
contract provision, 've believe that it presents a
proper situation for disposition on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The opposing party
cannot defeat its use by merely alleging that an
issue of fact exists (107 Fed. Supp. 84). While
a· motion for judgment on the pleadings admits
all facts well pleaded it does not admit, inter alia,
facts pleaded which would be inadmissible in evidence at the trial. (60 F. Supp. 729). Having
found the provision in question unabiguous, we
have no need in this case of extrinsic evidence
which plaintiffs propose to introduce. (Neale v.
Hinchcliffe, 20 Ariz. 452, 189 P. 1116). Therefore
defendant's motion is granted and plaintiffs'
amended petition on those counts is dismissed."
In a number of cases decided by this court the rule
of construction as applied in the two preceding cases is
adhered to.

Rttthrauff v. Silver King Western Mill and Mining
Company, 95 Ut. 279, 80 P. 2d 338. Ruthrauff acquired
an interest in the Augusta mining claim. He also attempted to acquire an additional· interest by a tax sale
purchase of a % interest. He then gave a quit claim deed
to Rose Brown, which stated that he and wife "do hereby
remise, release and quitclaim to party of the second part,
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her heirs and assigns forever, all an undivided 114 interest
in that certain lode mining claim known as the Augusta,"
etc. Plaintiff contends that the deed only intended to
convey the tax title interest and not that already held.
He tried to show this beyond the face of the deed. The
court says:
"This is not permissible, unless the intent and
meaning of the deed is upon its face uncertain
and obscure. In determining intent, we are restrained to the language employed - to the chosen
vehicle of the thought and purpose of its author.
If the meaning is clear, we may not resort to extraneous aids to interpret, modify, add to, or substract from its meaning. To do so would be to
assume the function of making contracts for the
parties under the guise of interpretation, a power
not delegated to the courts."

Johnson v. Geddes, 49 Utah 187, 161 P. 660. Plaintiff
sold defendants so1ne mining property for which defendants agreed to pay $21,000, $12,000 in money and $9,000
out of the net proceeds of the mine. The money was paid
but no mining operations were conducted and no further
payments made, although the deed, as agreed, was delivered upon payment of the $12,000. The net proceeds
were defined in the contract and the defendants were
to determine the extent and manner of managing and
developing the property. The plaintiff contended the
defendants had a reasonable time to perform and when
that time elapsed the $9,000 became due and owing, and
brought suit for that amount. The lower court adopted
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plaintiff's position and found that defendants, at the
time the contract was made had stated they would immediately work and develop the claims, that an examination of the claim revealed ore sufficient to pay off the
$9,000. Reversed.
The Supreme Court held the contract was plain and
the language so apt as to leave no room for construction.
"It is quite true that when the terms of a contract are uncertain or obscure the court not only
may, but it ought to, avail itself of all legitimate
legal evidence which will shed light upon the intention of the parties and upon the rights granted
upon the one side and obligations assumed upon
the other. A court may, however, not receive evidence for the sole purpose of enlarging the rights
upon the one side and increasing the obligations
upon the other. Nor may a court do that simply
because the provisions of the contract in its judgment should have been made more equitable."
Case dismissed.
To the same effect are the following cases: Erickson

v. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 102 P. 2d 310; Starley v. Deseret
Foods Corporation, 93 Utah 577, 74 P. 2d 1221; Mifflin
v. Shike, 77 Utah 190, 292 P. 1.
POINT II
BY THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRA·CTS
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DELAMARES WERE, AND
PLAINTIFF AS THEIR SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST IS, ENTITLED UNCONDITIONALLY TO A PERPETUAL AND CONTINUOUS FLOW OF 260 GALLON'S OF ·wATER PER MINUTE.
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In the light of the authorities above referred to let
us examine the language of the contracts here involved.
1. Both contracts recite in the first Whereas Clause
that the DeLaMares have developed by tunnel and other
work in Settlement Canyon, a flow of water and have
turned the water so developed into Settlement Canyon
Creek and thereby increased the volume of water naturally flowing in said creek.
2. The first contract, in the third Whereas Clause
refers to a resolution of the Board of Directors of the
Settlement Canyon Irrigation Company wherein the
Board "hereby recognizes and declares the right of said
Thomas DeLaMare and Annie L. DeLaMare to recover
from said creek a continuous and perpetual flow of 100
gallons of water per minute, in lieu of the water developed and added to the natural flow of said creek by them,
and that the said flow of 100 gallons of water per minute,
which the said DeLaMares are entitled to recover, as
aforesaid, may always be taken and diverted by them,
their heirs and assigns, from the water flowing out of
that certain tunnel from which the Tooele City Water
Company now takes its water for supplying the inhabitants of Tooele City.
3. In the Second contract the resolution of the Board
of Directors of the Settlement Canyon Irrigation Company reads that the company recognizes the right of the
DeJ~aMares

to recover from said creek a continuous and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
perpetual flow of 450 gallons of water per minute, in lieu
of the water developed and to be developed and added to
the natural flow of the creek by them, and that the 450
gallons per minute, which the DeLaMares are entitled to
recover, as aforesaid, may be taken and diverted by them,
their heirs and assigns, from the water flowing out of
that certain tunnel, describing the same tunnel as in the
first contract.
The Second contract contains an additional Whereas
clause which recites that since the passage of said resolution DeLaMare has "developed water so that he now
has 260 gallons of water per minute in said tunnel, and
that 100 gallons of said amount has already been transferred and set over to him leaving 160 gallons of water
yet to be transferred (only 260 of said 450 gallons have
been developed) and the parties hereto mutually agreeing to annul said resolution as ·to the 190 gallons per
minute not developed."
4. Both contracts then conclude, in consideration of
the premises and of the sum of $1.00, the Company
"agrees to and does hereby recognize and declare the
r~ght of" the DeLaMares "to recover from said creek a
continuous and perpetual flow of (100) (160) gallons
per minute of the water belonging to the" Company, "in
lieu of the water so developed and added to the natural
flow of said creek by" the DeLaMares. The Second contract then stipulates that the 160 gallons per minute is
"in addition to the 100 gallons per 1ninute heretofore
transferred."
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It is further stipulated in both contracts that' the
company "agrees that said continuous and perpetual flow
of (100) (160) gallons per n1inute of the water belonging"
to the con1pany to "\vhich the DeLaMares "are entitled, as
aforesaid, may always be taken and diverted by them,
their heirs and assigns, fro1n the water flo\ving out of
that certain tunnel from which the Tooele City Water
Company now takes its water for supplying the inhabitants of Tooele City."
It is apparent that these contracts cannot be interpreted by simply resorting to a dictionary definition of
the \vords "recover" and "in lieu of", as is attempted by
the appellant in its brief. The contracts must be considered as a whole. From the foregoing resume of the
provisions of the contract it is clear that the appellant
recognized and agreed that the DeLaMares had actually
developed a total of 260 gallons of water per minute by
their "\Vorkings and that they had added that quantity to
the flow of the creek. This was a fixed, definite quantity
so agreed upon. There is not the slightest intimation
that that quantity might vary above or below that quantity. If there should happen to be variations, the parties
eliminated all questions and disputes as to their respective rights contingent upon fluctuations either above or
below 260 gallons per minute by agreeing in unequivocal
language that that was the quantity they "'"'·ould each
reeognize. In other words, the parties first agreed that
the flow of the creek had been augmented by the DeLa-
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Mares workings to the extent of 260 gallons per minute
and that that quantity of water belonged to the DeLa~{ares.

Instead of agreeing that the DeLaaMres could take
the 260 gallons per minute so diverted and turned into
the creek by then1 at some point at or below the juncture
of the developed water with the creek, the parties agreed
that the equivalent quantity of water could be taken by
the DeLaMares from the Company's water at the Rench
tunnel, from which the Tooele City Water Co1npany then
was taking its water. By so taking, the DeLaMares would
recover and take the quantity of water they had developed. They could not thus recover, in the literal dictionary sense, the water they put into the creek, for that
water was spilled into the creek way below the Rench
tunnel. They could only get an equivalent quantity at
another point of diversion, and this would be in lieu of
the water they turned into the creek some distance below.
The all important element in the construction of
these contracts is, that by definite, certain, clear and
unambigous language, the Company agreed that the DeLaMares had acquired by their development work a
fixed quantity of water in the amount of 260 gallons per
minute. That being the fixed quantity basis of the rights
of the DeLaMares the words "recovers~ and "in lieu of"
can only mean that same quantity.
The language of the second contract is very significant, wherein it states that DeLaMares has "developed
water so that he n0"\\ has 260 gallons of water per min7
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ute in said tunnel and that 100 gallons of said amount
has already been transferred and set over to him, leaving 160 gallons per minute to be transferred." That is
very clear, definite, and unambiguous language. Not a
word is said about fluctuating quantities or the rights of
parties if the water developed in the DeLaMare workings
at any time either exceeded and became less than the
260 gallons per minute. Nor is a word said to indicate
that the DeLaMares could only take such quantity as
their tunneling produced in the event it was less than
260 gallons per minute at any particular time. The plain
language is that 260 gallons per minute are to be transferred and set over to the DeLaMares.
Both contracts provide that the Company agrees to
and does hereby declare and recognize the right of the
DeLaMares to recover from said creek a continuous and
perpetual flow of 100 gallons per minute in the first contract and 160 gallons per minute in the other of the water
belonging to the Company. This is in lieu of the water
developed and added to the natural flow of the stream
by the DeLaMares. Here again the language admits of
no uncertainty or equivocation. The flow to be taken by
the DeLaMares is a continuous and perpetual flow in the
quantities specified, 100 gallons per minute in the one
contract and 160 gallons per minute in the other.
To further emphasize that the parties were agreeIng to exact, unchanging and unfluctuating flows, the
contracts use again the terms "continuous and perpetual"
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by finally providing that such continuous and perpetual
flow of 100 gallons per n1inute in one contract and 160
gallons per minute in the other, to which the DeLaMares
are entitled, as aforesaid, ''may always be taken and diverted by them, their heirs and assigns from the water
flowing out of the" Rench tunnel. This clearly indicates
a continuous and perpetual condition, running to and for
the benefit of the heirs and assigns of the DeLaMares,
and gives the DeLaMares a definite and fixed quantity
that they could dispose of to their heirs and assigns.
Could any language be more certain, clear and
definite~ How can there be any room for reading into
that language a meaning that the DeLaMares could only
take such quantity as their tunnel produced if their
tunnel produced less than the 260 gallons per minute?
To so read the contracts would require a flagrant violation of the principles announced under Point I and would,
in effect, be making a new contract for the parties for
the first time in forty-four (44) years.
That the fixed quantities agreed to were not inequitable and were not based on poor judgment is attested by
44 years experience. But no matter what present conditions may be, as stated by this court in Johnson v.
Geddes, supra, a court may not enlarge the rights upon
the one side or increase the obligations upon the other
"simply because the provisions of the contract in its
judgment should have been more equitable."
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If the parties had intended to provide that the DeLaMares could only take at the Rench tunnel the equivalent quantity produced and emptied into the creek by the
DeLaMares, they could easily have said so. In such
event fixed quantities need not have been mentioned at
all, as that would only confuse the matter. However, if
they should use fixed quantities under such conditions,
it would be expected that they would provide for the
taking by the DeLaMares of water in excess of the fixed
quantities, as well as less than the fixed quantities, if
the tunnel produced more than the fixed quantities.
If you assume the contracts were intended to provide for a condition wherein the DeLaMare tunnel produced less than the quantities mentioned in the contract,
you must also assume that it was intended to provide
for a condition wherein such tunnel produced more than
such quantities. But significantly enough, the contracts
do not provide for either contingency. They fixed the
quantity of developed water and they fixed that quantity
as the quantity to \vhich the DeLaMares are entitled and
which they may take at the Rench Tunnel.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the contracts that the DeLaMares and
the Company sought to do two things: First, they agreed
between themselves as to the exact quantity of water that
each would recognize that the DeLaMare workings had
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produced and added to the stream and so belonged to
the DeLaMares. This, undoubtedly, was a co1npromise,
the chance of the DeLaMare works producing in excess
of 260 gallons per minute being at least as great as the
chance that they would produce less than that quantity.
The parties assumed that the water coming from the
DeLaMare tunnel would be as constant in flow as the
water coming from the Rench tunnel. They made no
provision in the contract for the contingency that either
would fluctuate or that either would produce less or more
than enough to fulfill the contracts. Second, they agreed
that that quantity of water could forever be taken by
the DeLaMares, and their successors and assigns, from
the water the Company owned coming from the Rench
tunnel, the Company thereby getting the water augmenting the creek through the DeLaMares ·works. It was in
effect an exchange of water in a definite fixed quantity.
No provision was made for making any measurement at anv time to determine whether and when the
water produced at the DeLaMare works exceeded or
of

became less than theW gallons per minute. No provision was made to provide any measuring devices to measure the flow into the creek from the DeLaMare tunnel.
No provision was made to adjust the flow to be taken
by the DeLaMares at the Rench tunnel to the flow coming into the creek from the DeLaMare tunnel. During
all of these 44 years no such provision has been made or
requested.
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We respectfully submit that the contracts are unambiguous. At the hearing in the Lower Court appellant
conceded this was the fact. It now seems to take the
position that there is ambiguity, but wholly fails to point
out wherein such ambiguity lies. Under the plain language of these contracts the City, as successor in interest
to the DeLaMares, is entitled unconditionally to 260 gallons of wat~r per minute. The judgment of the Lower
Court is correct and should be sustained with costs to the
respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
RALPH W. MILLBURN
HOMER HOLMGREN

Attorneys for Respondent
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